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The Genealogy of Duplicity in Henry James 
 
Perhaps no author in the modern Anglo-Saxon tradition has yet had a better sense than 
Henry James of what Nietzsche, in On the Genealogy of Morals and elsewhere, famously 
described as the “torture-chamber” of the soul in its making. Where else in American or 
British literature have such quintessentially Nietzschian themes as the subjugation of desire, 
the travails of sublimation and spiritualisation, of renunciation and sacrifice, found such 
rigorously formal and even dramatic representation as in James? Indeed the very thrust of the 
Jamesian formal enterprise seems to derive from a Nietzschian sentiment of “bad conscience,” 
that contradictory product of the pressure exerted upon the “human animal” by its 
introduction into society: 
 
I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress 
of the most fundamental change that he ever experienced – that change that occurred when he 
found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and peace. The situation that faced sea 
animals when they were compelled to become land animals or perish was the same as that 
which faced these semi-animals, well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to 
adventure: suddenly all their instincts were devalued and “suspended.” From now on they had to 
walk on their feet and “bear themselves” whereas hitherto they had been borne by water: a 
dreadful heaviness lay upon them. They felt unable to cope with the simplest undertakings; in 
this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and 
infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and 
effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their “consciousness,” their weakest 
and most fallible organ! (2.16) 
 
After going on to describe this “suspension” of the instincts and the dawning of 
consciousness as the greatest source of distress the earth had ever witnessed, Nietzsche relates 
how for such a deprived creature, racked with homesickness for the wild (for the 
“unconscious” use of his instincts), there must have appeared the alternative of reversing the 
situation and turning himself into an “adventure, a torture-chamber, an uncertain and 
dangerous wilderness,” how, in short, this yearning and desperate semi-animal became the 
inventor of the “bad conscience”: 
 
This secret self-ravishment, this artist’s cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon oneself as 
a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a critique, a contradiction, a 
contempt, a renunciation into it, this uncanny, dreadfully joyous work of a soul voluntarily at 
odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer – this active “bad 
conscience” – you will have guessed it – as the womb of all ideal and imaginary phenomena, 
eventually brought to light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps 
beauty itself. (2.18) 
 
The duplicity at the origin of the aesthetic impulse in Occidental culture derives, 
according to Nietzsche, from the turning of the animal “soul” against itself, taking sides 
against itself, imposing upon itself, as the most intractable of “materials”, a form. Like James, 
Nietzsche refuses to distinguish the moral from the aesthetic in the never-ending quest of the 
soul to surmount its disaccord with itself. The “artist’s cruelty” with which the self subjects 
itself to the constraint of form is itself a moral attribute, the most primitive or fundamental of 
them all, and this despite the pleasure that such voluptuous constraint evidently affords. One 
could cite numerous examples of artists in James’s fiction for whom aesthetic pleasure is not 
only concomitant with but derives from the moral impulse of self-determination and 
overcoming that Nietzsche describes. An example is the writer Mark Ambient, in “The 
Author of Beltraffio,” who speaks as lucidly as Nietzsche does in the passage just quoted of 
the voluptuous cruelty of his art and whose radical aestheticism is indeed less a product of the 
doctrine of “art for art” (57), as the narrator thinks, than the consequence of an “extreme 
dread of scandal” (78), directly linking the artist’s obsession with form (“the spirit in him that 
felt all life as plastic material” [89]) to what Nietzsche calls an “active bad conscience.” Such 
an active bad conscience is precisely what the artist’s wife, Beatrice, “the very angel of the 
pink of propriety” (92), dimly discerns in the aestheticism of her spouse, from whose 
influence she futilely hopes to protect the couple’s son, the beautiful Dolcino. The story owes 
its success to the fact that aesthetic sublimation as refined as that which Ambient achieves 
(“oh how it worries me, the shaping of the vase, the hammering of the metal! I have to 
hammer it so fine, so smooth […]. And all the while I have to be so careful not to let a drop of 
the liquor escape!” [87], etc.) is so persuasive that the only effects produced in its beholders 
are a manic form of suspicion, on one hand, and a sort of benighted blindness on the other. 
The scandal of beauty as the product of a bad conscience almost manages to remain a well-
kept secret in this text, despite the wife’s hyperbolical reaction to it and the narrator-critic’s 
near-perfect delusion. James’s abiding resistance however to the doctrine of “art for art”, as 
he articulates it in his essay on Baudelaire for example, derives from a distinct awareness he 
shared with Nietzsche of the moral genealogy of the artistic vocation. Beauty, as Nietzsche 
put it, is the product of a bad conscience.  The aesthetic instinct is never innocent in James. 
The point of Nietzsche’s criticism however is to get at the origin of bad conscience, 
not merely to qualify its effects and the transformations it will have undergone in the course 
of Western history, ending up producing precisely the kind of ultra-refined aesthetic 
consciousness that one finds in James. Bad conscience is itself the result of a fatal turn in the 
affairs of man, the reversal by means of which a stress or pressure originally exerted from 
without becomes a pressure exerting itself from within, producing that “secret self-
ravishment,” that “uncanny, dreadfully joyous work of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself,” 
in other words that simultaneously persecuted and persecuting interiority that anyone who has 
read James’s “The Turn of the Screw” is familiar with. Nietzsche, as we’ve seen, goes back to 
the dawn of civilisation to identify the “original” pressure undergone by the human-animal 
with its introduction into society and the denaturalisation of its instincts, in short with that 
terrifying expropriation from nature, giving birth to a ‘half-animal” suddenly unfit for its 
surroundings, weaker than before and overwhelmed by the weight of existence. A similar 
genealogical intention, less explicitly anthropological in character of course, can be found in 
James. Evidence of this resides in the very existence of the prologue James added to the 
principal narrative of “The Turn of the Screw.” For what other purpose does Douglas’s 
prologue serve but that of situating the origin of the governess’s duplicity, the origin of the 
epistemological pressure she exerts upon herself and her young victims – one of whom she 
might be said to have squeezed to death in the end –, in her voluntary acceptance, prior to the 
events she narrates, of the pressure exerted upon her by the proprietor of Bly? Like much of 
the European discourse whose idealistic intentions Nietzsche sets out to deconstruct, nothing 
in the narrative of the governess, a preacher’s daughter one remembers, is able to account for 
the bad conscience whose hyperactivity derives precisely from a violent will to conceal its 
origin from itself. The prologue reveals that the origin of the pressure the governess exerts 
upon herself and the children, the origin of that active and voluptuous duplicity of her soul, so 
productive indeed of ideal and imaginary phenomena, lies in her acceptance of the law or of 
the constraint of the beloved proprietor, to “take the whole thing over,” as Douglas reports, 
“and let him alone.” “That she should never trouble him – but never, never; neither appeal nor 
complain nor write about anything, only […] take the whole thing over and let him alone.” (6) 
The voluptuous duplicity and the secret self-ravishment of the governess, the veritable torture-
chamber she turns herself into depends upon a sacrifice of the instincts, as Nietzsche would 
put it, (“when […] he held her hand, thanking her for the sacrifice, she already felt rewarded” 
[6]), that is to say upon the renunciation of the immediate gratification of desire and the 
ineluctable turning of desire against itself in the production of imaginary phenomena, an ideal 
object. Not even the reversal of the ideal image of the beautiful proprietor into the spectral 
image of Peter Quint – the precise equivalent in James of Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism 
–, not even the repetitions of this fall from the beautiful to the grotesque, from the ideal to the 
ghostly, are able to shake the heroic bad conscience of the governess who prefers to believe in 
the “reality” of the ghosts rather than conduct a well-needed genealogical critique of their 
production. 
If bad conscience consists of a sort of half-deliberate blindness intended to avoid 
knowledge of the origin of consciousness and to maintain an idealistic belief in its ends, 
thereby transforming the sublimation of desire into an end in itself, and self-denial, as 
Nietzsche would put it, into a full-fledged project of spiritual redemption, then one must see 
James’s work as simultaneously partaking of this model and intent on its genealogical 
critique. Indeed James nurtures a certain duplicity with respect to the productive duplicity, or 
disaccord with oneself, that Nietzsche sees at the basis of the bad conscience. On one hand 
James, like the governess herself, milks the duplicity at the origin of the aesthetic impulse for 
all it is worth, sublimating a latent or repressed desire into an aesthetic form of idealism (“It 
isn’t to my possible glories I cling; it’s simply to my idea […] I like it better than anything 
else,” says the artist-comedian, Miriam Rooth, in The Tragic Muse [436]); on the other, and 
no doubt secretly at first, working backward, genealogically, against the flow of his own 
creative instinct, that is to say against his own “decadence,” in the Nietzschian sense. This 
conflict comes to a head in the late 1880’s, when James was writing what he then thought 
would be his “last long novel” (A Life in Letters, 224), The Tragic Muse. This novel bears all 
the signs of a bad conscience making matters worse for itself by deliberately building upon an 
aesthetic idealism it no longer believes in, while in a series of short fictions written in the 
years just prior to The Tragic Muse James is already busy at work undermining that same 
ideology. The genealogical intent at work in such short, apparently modest works like “The 
Modern Warning” and “A London Life,” both published in 1888 before James had started 
work on The Tragic Muse, “The Chaperon” (1891), and the brief, intensely focused study, 
“The Visits” (1892), would culminate in 1898 with “The Turn of the Screw.”  In order to get a 
glimpse of the genealogical critique of the duplicity at the source of James’s own aesthetic 
consciousness it is worth taking a closer look at a scene from one of these stories. 
The scene we’ll come to in a moment is from “A London Life.” The principal 
character is a young American girl, Laura Wing, who is visiting her sister and her brother-in-
law in England for the first time. It is not without pertinence, of course, that James has 
furnished each of the tales I’ve just mentioned, as well as other writings from the same period, 
with a young female reflector – something about the consciousness of a girl, or of a young 
woman, at the more or less awkward age of her entry into society being what he appears to 
deem the ideal device for his genealogical explorations. The dramatic situation in which the 
young heroines of these stories find themselves tends to spring precisely from that 
“expropriation” from nature which Nietzsche identified, with equal pleasure but with perhaps 
less pity than James, as concomitant with the introduction of the “human-animal” into society. 
Such expropriation – the word appears in the second paragraph of “A London Life,” where it 
becomes evident that Laura Wing is haunted by a strange sensation of duplicity – is frequently 
dramatized in James by the sentiment of impropriety or shame, which the young heroines of 
course are always quite zealous to rectify. Since the expropriation in question can never be 
felt otherwise than in a mediated way, the scandal at the source of the heroine’s bad 
conscience is often to be found in the misbehaviour of a close relative, a sister or a mother, for 
example, rather than in any impropriety of her own.1 In the texts just mentioned and others 
James plays on the proximity of the words “property” and propriety”, an obsession with 
property (“Within the lodge-gates or without them it all seemed alike a park – so intensely 
and immutably ‘property’”, thinks Laura Wing in the opening scene of “A London Life” [88]) 
always reinforcing in the end an even more intimate, and genealogically anterior, sense of 
expropriation, in other words an impropriety that the heroine attempts to overcome in the 
course of her adventure. Such an attempt usually ends in failure. In “The Modern Warning,” 
Lady Chasemore’s hyperbolical attempt to overcome the shame she feels in the eyes of her 
American brother – her British husband has written what she fears to be a scandalous book 
                                                
1 As the narrator of “The Chaperon” says of Rose Tramore’s feelings with respect to her mother’s scandalous 
life-style: “If one thing were more present to her than another it was the very desolation of their propriety.” (97). 
In like manner Fleda Vetch’s love for Owen Gareth, in The Spoils of Poynton, is rendered exquisitely spiritual, 
the joyous work of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself, as Nietzsche would put it, not by the sentiment of her 
own dispossession, but by that of her would-be mother-in-law, Mrs Gereth, who through her son’s marriage 
would find herself dispossessed of her property, Poynton. 
about her homeland – ultimately leads to the young woman’s suicide; and in the most 
poignant text of all, “The Visits,” where the expropriation from nature and the inscription of 
the “human-animal” in the symbolic order of society is dramatised by a girl’s involuntary 
verbal outburst to a young man in a moment of uncontrollable desire (“I broke out to him, I 
told him, […] it was as if I were borne along in the air by the wonder of what I had said – it 
rolled over me that I was lost” [161]), the impropriety proves insurmountable and Louisa 
Chantry dies, unconscious, several days afterward.  
As a careful analysis of this group of texts could show, the expropriation from nature 
that Nietzsche describes as the condition of consciousness corresponds in James with the 
subject’s assumption of the faculty of language. Over and over in James, and beginning in 
these genealogical studies of the late 1880’s and 1890’s, the duplicity or internal contradiction 
characteristic of consciousness is revealed to derive from the attempt to compensate, always 
in a more or less hyperbolical manner, for what one might call the linguistic expropriation of 
the subject. In The Tragic Muse this linguistic expropriation is dramatised by Nick Dormer’s 
“ejaculation” (28) at the instant of Gabriel Nash’s appearance, at the beginning of the novel, 
and is compensated for by this appearance itself, in a scene of specular recognition 
constituting the subject on the basis of its dispossession. In “The Visits” and “A London 
Life,” however, a similar desire for recognition by the other fails tragically, leading to the 
pure expropriation of the subject. Laura Wing, unlike Louisa Chantry, survives nonetheless 
the experience, with only a few sick days in bed following the impropriety she commits. 
The scene in “A London Life” that I want to focus on is precisely one of the specular 
recognition, or lack of such, that always occurs in James immediately after the linguistic 
expropriation of the subject. The scene occurs at the opera, just after what Laura Wing 
afterwards calls her “monstrous overture ” (116), in other words just after having committed 
the impropriety of expressing to Wendover her desire that he ask her to marry him. Her 
motivation for this is complicated, for the scandal of what the young woman sees as the 
“expropriation” of her sister’s mother-in-law from Mellows, from which the story begins, is 
itself a metonymy for a more intimate impropriety, that of her sister Selina’s licentious sexual 
behaviour. In short, Laura Wing feels her own respectability to be so sullied by the 
impropriety of her sister that when it is revealed to her, at the opera, that Selina has just fled 
across the Channel with her most recent lover, leaving her to take the brunt of the ostracism 
her sister deserves, she determines that the best chance of overcoming her public exposure lies 
in the demand that Wendover, her opera companion (“he gave her a feeling of high 
respectability” [67]), ask her to marry her on the spot, in advance of the news he’ll receive on 
the morrow of her sister’s adultery. If she has some slight reason to entertain such a hope, this 
hope takes on hyperbolical proportions to the precise extent that she feels her position to be a 
vulnerable one: 
 
Laura’s spirit was all suspense – suspense of which she returned the pressure, trying to twist it 
into faith.  There was a chance in life that sat there beside her, but it would go forever if it didn’t 
move nearer that night; whereby she listened, she watched for it to move.  I need scare mention 
that this chance presented itself in the person of Mr. Wendover, who more than any one 
concerned with her had it in his hand to redeem her detestable position.  To-morrow he would 
know, and would think sufficiently little of a young person of that breed: therefore it could only 
be a question of speaking on the spot.  That was what she had come back to the box for – to give 
him his opportunity. (113)  
 
Everything depends here upon the “twisting” of the “pressure” she undergoes into a 
“faith,” the faith that her sense of impropriety will be redeemed in advance of its exposure by 
Wendover’s recognition of her desire. As the word “twist” suggests, the pressure is 
tropological, implying here the substitutive exchange of a specular recognition by the other 
for the loss of self-identity that will reach its climax in the girl’s verbal outburst. Time passes, 
however, and Wendover remains silent, increasing the pressure, obliging the girl at last to 
utter her “monstrous overture”: 
 
If he had nothing to say, why had he said, why had he done, what did he mean ––––?  But the 
girl’s inward challenge to him lost itself in a mist of faintness; she was screwing herself up to a 
purpose of her own, and it hurt almost to anguish, while the whole place about became a blur 
and a swim through which she heard the tuning of fiddles.  Before she knew it she had said to 
him: “Why have you come so often?” (114) 
 
This scene will be repeated with perhaps greater effect in “The Turn of the Screw,” where the 
same tropological pressure (“she was screwing herself up”) gets the better of the governess in 
her own “monstrous utterance of names” (51).2 In both cases a more or less secret desire for 
recognition is involuntarily expressed, leading to a scandalous outburst and the expropriation 
                                                
2 Compare, in particular, with the scene where the governess shuts herself up in the schoolroom and tries, as she 
says, to “come to the point”: “the strange dizzy lift or swim (I try for terms!) into a stillness, a pause of all life, 
that had nothing to do with the more or less noise we at the moment might be engaged in making and that I could 
hear through any intensified mirth or quickened recitation or louder strum of the piano. Then it was that the 
others, the outsiders, were there.” (51) 
of the subject.3 Unfortunately for Laura, Wendover is caught totally off guard by her words. 
What happens then is that instead of substituting his recognition of the girl for the girl’s loss 
of self-possession, in a specular moment of exchange where the other constitutes the self, 
Wendover appears to the girl (much as the ghosts appear in the gaze of the governess) as a 
reflection of the tropological tension that had itself led to the “monstrous overture.” This is 
clear in the following paragraph, where the tropological pressure (“twisting”, “screwing”) 
released in the verbal outburst returns in a strange and violent manner upon Laura, just as 
Wendover is slowly catching on to her wish and preparing to declare his love for her: 
 
For an instant she thought he was coming nearer, but he didn’t: he stood there twirling his 
gloves. Then an unspeakable shame, a great horror, horror of herself, of him, of everything, 
came over her, and she sank into a chair at the back of the box, with averted eyes, trying to get 
further into her corner. “Leave me, leave me, go away!” she said in the lowest tone he could 
hear. The whole house seemed to be listening to her, pressing into the box. […] “You don’t love 
me – and you torture me by staying!” Laura went on in a convulsed voice.  “For God’s sake go 
away and don’t speak to me, don’t let me see you or hear of you again!” (115-16) 
 
He catches on too late; she becomes hysterical. Instead of canalising and temporalising 
the tropological tension that has led to the girl’s outburst, Wendover’s mere reflection of it 
has the effect of returning the pressure. For what does the “twirling” of his gloves reflect, 
precisely, if not the “twisting” and the “screwing up” of the girl’s tension into a highly 
speculative faith in him? Indeed the very name Wendover – Laura Wing, we’ve been alerted, 
is highly sensitive to names – suggests the same thing, for Wendung, in German, means turn. 
What Laura Wing finds herself confronted with then is a specular image of the hyperbolic 
tropological activity of her own mind. Instead of a moment of recognition which sooner or 
later always reveals itself to be illusory – but which is nonetheless absolutely necessary to the 
constitution of the self –, what the specular image reveals here is the tropological structure, 
founded in language, that underlies all cognition in James. Prefiguring the ghosts whose 
turning on the staircase at Bly will have the same horrifying effect on the governess, 
Wendover “coloured” we read a few lines further on, “looked […] unmistakeably 
discomposed.” (115) A ghost is always but the visual trace of the linguistic moment 
                                                
3 In “The Turn of the Screw”: “I always broke down in the monstrous utterance of names. As they died away on 
my lips I said to myself that I should indeed help them to represent something infamous if by pronouncing them 
I should violate as rare a little case of instinctive delicacy as any schoolroom had probably ever known. When I 
said to myself: ‘They have the manners to be silent, and you, trusted as you are, the baseness to speak!’ I felt 
myself crimson and covered my face with my hands.” (51) 
constitutive of consciousness. In precise contrast to Gabriel Nash, the saving angel whose 
equally specular apparition helped Dormer overcome his “crisis” (27) in The Tragic Muse, 
ghosts and other more or less decomposed figures in James have the opposite, demonic effect 
of reflecting the tropological condition of consciousness and undercutting its idealistic 
aspirations. 
What such scenes in James reveal is that man is a tropological animal. They reveal a 
genealogical intention or deconstructive force in James at least as fruitful, if more discrete, 
than that which one finds in Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s image of an aquatic animal suddenly 
become terrestrial, forced all at once to “bear itself” where previously it had been borne by 
water, is an apt metaphor for the transition in James from nature to culture, from pre-linguistic 
being to the symbolic order of society. Man’s promise, according to Nietzsche, depends on his 
expropriation from nature, on a weakness, a terrible vulnerability. James’s narrator, at the end 
of “A London Life,” somewhat ironically describes Laura Wing’s vulnerability this way: 
 
It is apt to be the disadvantage of women, on occasions of measuring their strength with men, that they 
may feel in the man a larger experience, and feel their own precious substance, their general ‘side,’ as part 
of that resource. It is doubtless as a provision against such emergencies that nature has opened to them 
operations of the mind quite independent of experience. (139-40) 
 
What these “operations of the mind quite independent of experience” refer to is the 
tropological (or mimetic) faculty serving to compensate for what James’s text designates as an 
anterior impropriety, in other words for an original lack (or loss) of nature that can never be 
identified in non-metaphorical terms. Duplicity in James, in particular that active duplicity of 
the bad conscience informing the aesthetic impulse itself, originates precisely in such a lack of 
nature. 
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